Abstract
Introduction
Between 2003 and 2007, the EU launched 18 crisis management operations in 11 third countries within the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 1 In the majority of cases, the EU entered into so-called status of forces and status of mission agreements with the third states concerned to defi ne the privileges and immunities of EU missions and their personnel, while in other cases already existing status arrangements were extended to cover EU operations. The need to determine the legal position of EU crisis management missions during their presence abroad has presented the EU with a signifi cant opportunity ' to assert its identity on the international scene ' .
2 Not only has the Union entered into an ever growing number of international agreements in its own name, but it has also had to devise and implement a negotiating strategy for concluding status agreements with third states under the ESDP. The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of the EU's practice in this area. 3 Status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and status of mission agreements (SOMAs) are bilateral or multilateral treaties that defi ne the legal position of military forces and civilian personnel deployed by one or more states or by an international organization in the territory of another state with the latter's consent. 4 They normally deal with 1 The ESDP was launched by the European Council in June 1999 in order to provide the EU with the operational capabilities, made available to the EU by its Member States on a voluntary basis, and the institutional basis necessary for conducting autonomous crisis management operations in third countries. The ESDP's underlying purpose is to enable the EU to respond more effectively to international crises. such issues as the entry and departure of foreign personnel, the carrying of arms, taxation, the settlement of claims, and the modalities for the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction over members of the visiting force or mission. Despite the increasingly widespread use of SOFAs and SOMAs during the 20th century, 5 a combination of three factors has prevented the emergence of a uniform legal regime in this fi eld comparable, for example, to the law of diplomatic relations. 6 First, states send their military and civilian personnel abroad for different non-hostile purposes, including exercises, technical and advisory missions, and large-scale peacekeeping operations. Secondly, the operational circumstances surrounding the deployment of foreign personnel differ drastically from one case to another. Legal arrangements devised for a stable and secure operational environment will almost certainly be unsuitable and inappropriate in post-confl ict situations or cases where effective governmental authority is lacking in the host state. 7 Thirdly, great powers tend to rely on their dominant position to secure more favourable conditions of stay for their forces abroad than they are prepared to grant to foreign forces present in their own territory. 8 The combined effect of the diverse objectives pursued by foreign personnel, different considerations of military and operational necessity, and the political disparities between sending states and host states means that SOFAs and SOMAs differ widely in their terms.
Even though no single legal regime governing the status of visiting forces and missions has developed in international law, several distinct regimes can nevertheless be identifi ed. For instance, SOFAs concluded in the context of structured military cooperation between politically equal partners are frequently based on the NATO SOFA of 1951. 9 The Member States of the EU have thus modelled the EU SOFA of 2003, 10 which governs the legal position of their military and civilian staff deployed within the territory of the EU for the purposes of the ESDP, on the relevant provisions of the NATO SOFA. 11 The UN and other international actors have also developed distinct arrangements regulating the immunities and privileges of peace support operations. 12 Generally speaking, these legal regimes offer different answers to the same basic question: how to reconcile the divergent interests of the sending state or organization on the one hand and those of the host state on the other hand, in particular as regards the exercise of jurisdiction in the territory of the host state over the visiting force or mission and its members?
This article examines what solution the EU has adopted to this problem. It begins with an outline of the various crisis management operations the EU has launched in the context of the ESDP between 2003 and the second half of 2007, and describes the evolution of its practice of concluding SOFAs and SOMAs with the third countries hosting these operations. The article will then examine in more detail the key provisions of two model status agreements adopted by the EU in 2005, and offer some concluding remarks.
ESDP Operations Between 2003 and 2007
Out of a total of 18 ESDP operations launched between 2003 and 2007, fi ve were military in nature, 12 civilian, and one mixed military -civilian. 13 Since the ESDP forms an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), all ESDP missions pursue one or more of the foreign policy objectives of the EU set out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
14 More specifi cally, military operations may be conducted to carry out the so-called Petersberg tasks listed in Article 17(2) TEU, that is ' humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking ' . 15 Although none of these three missions is formally considered to be an ESDP operation, all of them are crisis management missions conducted by the EU that in certain respects, given their tasks, duration, or legal basis, resemble ESDP operations. The 18 ESDP missions launched to date share a number of common features, yet signifi cant differences exist between them as well. On the one hand, all missions were established by the Council of the European Union in the form of a Joint Action based on Article 14 TEU. In all cases, the Council entrusted the Political and Security Committee with the political control and strategic direction of the operation in accordance with Article 25 TEU. The personnel and assets employed were seconded or made available by the Member States and institutions of the EU as well as by third states and organizations, such as NATO. 34 In all 18 cases, the deployment of troops and civilian personnel was based on the express consent of the third state hosting the mission concerned. Civilian missions were fi nanced from the budget of the European Communities, whereas the costs of military operations were borne by the EU Member States and any contributing third states pursuant to Article 28(3) TEU.
35 All operations were launched to complement or support already existing European and international donor programmes and activities on the ground.
On the other hand, ESDP missions differ signifi cantly in their size. Whereas EUJUST Themis in Georgia consisted of fewer than a dozen civilian experts, the EU's largest crisis management operation so far, Althea in BiH, numbered close to 7,000 military personnel at its height. The costs involved in fi elding an operation vary considerably too: while the fi nancial reference amount for EUPAT was € 1.5 million, the common costs of EUFOR RD Congo stood at close to € 17 million. As regards their basic objectives, ESDP operations have ranged from supervisory ( EU BAM Rafah ), training ( EUJUST Lex ), advisory ( EUSEC RD Congo ), and monitoring ( AMM ) missions to military operations tasked to contribute to safety and security in their area of deployment ( Althea ). The members of these missions have carried out their tasks in radically different operational environments, from the corridors of the Georgian Ministry of Justice to the alleyways of Bunia in the DRC. Four operations, Artemis , Althea, EUFOR RD Congo , and EURFOR Tchad/RCA were authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary measures, including armed force, to accomplish their mandate. 36 Finally, the political and economic relations between the EU and the various host states also differ considerably. For example, as potential members of the bloc, BiH and FYROM enjoy closer and deeper ties with the EU as a whole than the DRC, a major benefi ciary of European development assistance.
The Evolution of the Legal Status of ESDP Missions

A Status Arrangements under the ESDP
Subject to one exception, steps were taken in the course of all ESDP operations to defi ne their legal status under international law during their presence in the territory of the host state. The resulting legal arrangements are far from uniform, however. In the majority of cases, the EU has entered into separate SOFAs or SOMAs with each host country concerned in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 34 Regarding cooperation between the EU and NATO in the fi eld of the ESDP see App. While these arrangements appear to be non-binding instruments, the commitments undertaken by the third parties concerned in these instruments, whereby they agreed to grant certain privileges and immunities to the relevant EU missions and their personnel, were clearly intended to produce legal effects. Cf Considerable differences exist between the status agreements negotiated by the EU for the purposes of an ESDP operation and those pre-existing legal arrangements that have been extended to such operations on an ad hoc basis. By contrast, a comparison of the successive status agreements concluded directly by the EU reveals a relatively high degree of consistency between them as well as a clear pattern in their evolution. Since the common purpose of status agreements is to confer certain privileges and immunities on a body of foreign military or civilian personnel, 57 all SOFAs and SOMAs concluded by the EU address certain basic legal and practical questions. In particular, almost all of them include provisions regulating the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction by the local authorities over members of the mission, as well as provisions governing their entry and departure, freedom of movement, means of transport, and communications in the territory of the host state. In addition, the EU has followed its own earlier practice in negotiating new SOFAs and SOMAs. Although agreements concluded under Article 24 TEU are negotiated by the Presidency under the direction of the Council, members of the General Secretariat of the Council have played a key role in drafting ESDP status agreements. 58 This has enabled the General Secretariat to act as an institutional memory in relation to these agreements.
Two broad phases can be identifi ed in the development of the EU's practice relating to SOMAs and SOFAs. The fi rst phase begins with the conclusion of an agreement between the EU and BiH in late 2002 concerning the legal position of EUPM . This period is characterized by efforts to defi ne the general principles to be followed by the EU in negotiating status agreements in the context of the ESDP. The second phase begins with the adoption of a generic EU Model SOFA and an EU Model SOMA in mid-2005. These two model agreements constitute the current framework for negotiating status agreements for future EU crisis management operations.
B The First Phase: Diplomatic Status and its Discontents
It appears that no advance planning was undertaken by the Council on the question of status agreements before the fi rst ever ESDP mission, EUPM in BiH, was launched. Instead, the SOMA concluded between the EU and BiH in October 2002 for the purposes of EUPM simply followed the most relevant precedent of the time, that is the 56 Council doc. 11621/05, ' Public access to documents -Confi rmatory application N° 33/c/03/05 ' (submitted by the author), 5 Sept. 2005, at 4. In addition, it should be noted that the position of national contingents in the territory of the host state may also be subject to bilateral or multilateral agreements, including SOFAs, concluded between the host state and the states contributing personnel and assets to an ESDP operation.
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Supra note 4. The only exception in this regard is the EUPM SOMA, which closely follows the status agreements concluded for the ECMM/EUMM, and is less detailed than subsequent ESDP status agreements. arrangements adopted to regulate the legal position of the EUMM . The Memorandum of Understanding defi ning the mandate and status of the EUMM ' s predecessor, the European Community Monitoring Mission ( ECMM ), provided that its personnel should during their mission be granted the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents, 59 as defi ned in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (VCDR). 60 When the ECMM was restructured and transformed into the EUMM in 2000, the EU entered into new SOMAs with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FYROM, and Albania. 61 These agreements continued the earlier arrangements and granted the EUMM the status of a diplomatic mission and its personnel the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents. This precedent was followed in the case of EUPM and subsequently in operations Concordia , Proxima , EUPAT , EUJUST Themis , EUPOL Kinshasa, and EUSEC RD Congo .
The conferment of diplomatic privileges and immunities on foreign military and civilian personnel is not unusual in international law. Military, naval, and air attachés and other military staff attached to a foreign embassy normally benefi t from the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents. 62 Full diplomatic privileges and immunities are sometimes conferred on the heads of foreign military missions, 63 and occasionally on their members as well. 64 Personnel deployed abroad for various shortterm activities, such as exercises, training activities, or disaster relief, are frequently granted a status equivalent to that accorded to administrative and technical staff under the VCDR, 65 in particular in the treaty practice of the United States. 66 In the fi eld of peacekeeping, the head of mission or force commander and other high-ranking members of peace support operations are routinely granted the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents. 67 However, it is far less common to confer diplomatic status on all members of a peace support operation. Small detachments of an operation and individual national contingents have occasionally been accorded the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents or those of technical and administrative staff under the VCDR. 68 In addition, members of UN military observer missions have in the past been granted full diplomatic status, 69 but in more recent decades only senior members of observer missions have benefi ted from such treatment. 70 The EU's early practice of entering into agreements stipulating that all members of an ESDP operation shall be granted privileges and immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by diplomatic agents is therefore somewhat exceptional, as this goes beyond the privileges and immunities normally conferred on members of peace support operations under similar circumstances.
It is not entirely clear why the EU has adopted this approach. Relying on the relevant provisions of the VCDR absolves the EU and host states from having to draft detailed defi nitions themselves, yet it is unlikely that this fairly widespread drafting technique was chosen simply for reasons of convenience. 71 While the precedent of the ECMM and EUMM SOMAs may account for the conclusion of similar agreements with FYROM and BiH, it does not explain why the EU has negotiated such arrangements with Georgia and the DRC. Since the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents are broader than those normally granted to foreign troops, 72 the most likely explanation is that the EU has demanded full diplomatic status for members of ESDP operations as a means to maximize their privileges and immunities in the territory of the host state. However, third states and local communities may consider this strategy heavy-handed. 73 While the conferment of full diplomatic status may be appropriate on an exceptional basis and in the case of smaller missions, such as EUJUST Themis , EUPOL Kinshasa, or EUSEC RD Congo , it is more diffi cult to justify why members 67 Para Unlike diplomatic agents, foreign military personnel are usually liable to arrest and brief periods of detention by the local authorities, their private residence is not inviolable, nor do members of their household benefi t from most of the privileges and immunities they themselves enjoy. of ESDP operations should benefi t from the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents as a general rule, especially in the case of operations involving large, self-suffi cient bodies of military and civilian personnel. 74 Doubts were raised about this strategy within the EU from the outset. In a study dealing with the drafting of status agreements for EU police missions published in October 2002, the Council General Secretariat noted that the purpose of SOFAs and SOMAs is to confer ' protective legal status ' on members of a crisis management operation. 75 However, according to the General Secretariat, a balance must be struck between this objective and the need to respect the territorial sovereignty of the host state, so that only such privileges and immunities should be sought as are necessary to ensure the legal security of ESDP personnel. 76 This emphasis on the strict functionality of the privileges and immunities to be negotiated with host states is clearly at odds with the EU's repeated requests for treatment equivalent to full diplomatic status.
Similar points were made in a paper submitted by the Danish Presidency in December 2002.
77 Not only did the paper suggest that privileges were less important than immunities in order to ensure the independence and legal protection of an EU crisis management mission, 78 but it also advised against the wholesale adoption of the status regimes contained in the VCDR or the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN of 1946. 79 Instead, it favoured a more fl exible ' building-block ' approach whereby the privileges and immunities of an EU mission would be defi ned on a caseby-case basis so as to refl ect its specifi c functions and operational circumstances. The Presidency paper also recalled the need to strike a balance between the privileges and immunities of ESDP personnel, the sovereignty of the host state, and the rule of law, and in this respect underlined that consideration would have to be given to the public perception of the mission. 80 81 Regrettably, the document offered no further details.
C The Model Agreement for EU Police Missions: a Duty of Self-restraint?
The concerns raised in the Danish Presidency paper were addressed for the fi rst time in a model status agreement for EU police missions drafted by the General Secretariat of the Council. 82 Whereas early versions of the model agreement did not contain any provisions dealing with privileges and immunities, the third revised version drafted in April 2003 offered EU decision-makers a choice between three different legal solutions, depending on the overall legal, political, and security situation in the host state, including the human rights situation and the state of the local judicial system. 83 Under the fi rst scenario, members of an EU police mission were to be granted privileges and immunities equivalent to those set out in section 22 of the UN Privileges and Immunities Convention, which defi nes the legal position of experts on mission for the UN. 84 In effect, the General Secretariat thereby proposed that the EU should follow the practice that has evolved in the context of UN peacekeeping. 85 Since peace support operations established by and operating under the command and control of the UN are subsidiary organs of the Organization, in principle, they and their personnel fall within the scope of application of the UN Privileges and Immunities Convention. Accordingly, civilian police and other civilian personnel taking part in UN peace support operations are considered as experts on mission for the UN, and therefore benefi t from the privileges and immunities listed in section 22 of the Convention. 86 The same provision was to be applied to the personnel of EU police missions by analogy. 87 The second scenario was identical with the fi rst, except that it also conferred on members of EU police missions ' absolute immunity ' from the criminal jurisdiction of the host state. Apart from highranking offi cials, usually only military members of a military component enjoy complete immunity from local criminal jurisdiction in UN peacekeeping practice. 88 under the third scenario, personnel performing ' essential functions ' in the framework of an EU police mission were to be granted all privileges and immunities equivalent to those of diplomatic agents, while locally hired personnel performing auxiliary functions were to benefi t from privileges and immunities equivalent to those granted to ' similar staff ' under the VCDR, which presumably meant administrative and technical personnel.
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As the General Secretariat explained in a footnote, the purpose of offering decisionmakers a choice between these three scenarios was to enable them to strike ' an appropriate balance between the requirement to allow EU mission personnel to fulfi l their mandate safely and independently, and the necessity to respect the Rule of Law in the territory of the Host Party ' . 90 The footnote went on to proclaim that the ' EU will act responsibly when deciding the appropriate degree of privileges and immunities for each mission ' . 91 This statement seems to imply that the EU is under some kind of an obligation to choose the least intrusive of the three scenarios under the prevailing circumstances. In fact, whatever the relevant ethical considerations may be, 92 no legal obligation to this effect exists. There is no principle of international law which compels the EU to request only such privileges and immunities as are strictly necessary to enable ESDP missions to carry out their mandate. Even the conferment of very extensive privileges and immunities does not infringe the sovereignty of the host state, given that every state is free, in principle, 93 to waive its right to exercise its jurisdictional competences within its territory. 94 No rule or principle of international law requires that the resulting status agreements must be based on reciprocity. 95 Moreover, not only can jurisdictional immunities be waived, but the EU and host states may agree to establish alternative procedures and mechanisms for resolving disputes involving private claimants. 98 It should be remembered in this respect that, as a matter of international law, the jurisdictional competences of sending states extend to acts committed by their nationals and offi cials abroad, 99 and that in many cases status agreements permit the authorities of the sending state to exercise some of these competences in the territory of the host state in accordance with their own laws and regulations. 100 In any event, the domestic authorities of sending states will almost certainly be able to institute proceedings against such nationals and offi cials once they have returned to the territory of the sending state. 101 The exemption of ESDP personnel from local jurisdiction therefore does not inevitably lead to unaccountability and impunity.
Nevertheless, the jurisdictional immunities granted to ESDP missions and their personnel may have implications for the protection of fundamental human rights, above all the right of private individuals in the host state to have their civil rights and obligations determined before a court or tribunal in accordance with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 102 assuming that the Convention applies to them. 103 The right to access courts or tribunals enshrined in the ECHR is not absolute, but may be restricted subject to certain conditions. First, it may not be limited in such a way or to such an extent that its very essence is impaired; secondly, the restrictions in question must pursue a legitimate aim and a reasonable relationship of proportionality must exist between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.
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The attribution of privileges and immunities to ESDP personnel in order to enable them to carry out their mandate, as agreed between the EU and the host state, clearly constitutes a legitimate aim, especially where the terms of a status agreement simply give effect to the host state's obligations under customary international law to exempt foreign personnel from its jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of state immunity.
105 By contrast, it is diffi cult, if not impossible, to decide on the basis of normative considerations whether the restrictions imposed by ESDP status agreements on the right to access courts is proportionate to the aim they pursue, that is whether the extent of the legal exemptions conferred on ESDP missions is proportionate to the objective of enabling them to carry out their mandate. What constitutes an ' appropriate balance ' between the need for legal security of an ESDP operation and respect for the territorial sovereignty of the host state depends entirely on the political judgement of the EU and the host state concerned: nothing prevents the two parties from entering into legal relations biased in favour of the EU if this is what both of them consider expedient under the circumstances. In effect, the test of proportionality would involve a judicial assessment of whether or not the deployment of an ESDP operation under the conditions agreed can reasonably be said to benefi t both parties in equal measure. While it may be argued that this matter is not justiciable, in the fi nal analysis the extension of diplomatic status to foreign military and civilian personnel cannot be said to be altogether disproportionate, since diplomatic privileges and immunities form a well-established legal regime in international law that the European Court of Human Rights has found to be compatible with the ECHR. Accordingly, neither general international law nor the norms of international human rights law impose a duty of self-restraint on the EU in the negotiation of privileges and immunities, provided that private individuals present in the host state are able effectively to assert their rights in relation to an ESDP mission and its personnel in one form or another. 107 The fact that since April 2003 the EU has requested and obtained full diplomatic privileges and immunities for fi ve ESDP operations ( Proxima , EUPAT , EUJUST Themis , EUPOL Kinshasa, and EUSEC RD Congo ), including two police missions, suggests that the Council's General Secretariat's calls for moderation were not heeded. However, there are indications that the practice of requesting treatment equivalent to full diplomatic status for ESDP missions and their members continued to be a matter of debate among the Member States. 108 In the case of EUJUST Themis , the Political and Security Committee felt compelled to declare that ' the extent of the privileges and immunities foreseen [in the SOMA concluded between the EU and Georgia] for staff of the Mission do not constitute a precedent ' for future missions.
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D The Second Phase: the EU Model SOFA and SOMA
The second phase in the development of the EU's practice relating to status agreements began with the adoption of an EU Model SOFA and an EU Model SOMA. 110 The experiences gained in the course of the fi rst few ESDP missions highlighted the need to streamline the procedures governing the conclusion of international agreements with third countries under Article 24 TEU. The fact that Article 24 TEU requires two successive decisions by the Council -one to authorize the Presidency to open negotiations and one to approve the resulting text -meant that in practice this provision turned out to be ' a cumbersome tool for negotiating agreements with third parties ' . 111 and assets to the mission already in the early stages of the planning process to be able to defi ne the modalities of their participation in the mission in time. The fact that parallel negotiations had to be conducted with a large number of third states appears to have signifi cantly increased the administrative burden this entailed. 112 The diffi culties encountered in fi nancing operation Concordia further underlined the importance of having effi cient procedures in place to enable the EU to enter into the necessary agreements with host states and contributing third states as soon as possible. 113 The Council responded to these experiences by concluding several framework participation agreements with third states and by adopting model texts to accelerate the conclusion of international agreements under Article 24 TEU. On 23 February 2004, the Council approved a generic ' framework participation agreement ' to serve as a basis for establishing a permanent legal framework for the participation of third states in future EU crisis management operations, 114 and authorized the Presidency to open negotiations with certain third countries to this end. 115 So far, the EU has entered into such agreements with seven third countries, 116 two of which have since become Member States of the EU. This was followed by the adoption, on 13 September 2004, of two model agreements on the participation of third states in military and civilian crisis management operations led by the EU. 117 As before, the Council authorized the Presidency to open negotiations on the basis of these model agreements with third countries which have not entered into framework participation agreements with the EU in order to defi ne the conditions governing their participation in future ESDP missions. both cases, the Council authorized the Presidency, assisted where necessary by the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP, 122 to open negotiations with prospective host states based on the model agreements in order to defi ne the legal status of future ESDP missions. The EU Model SOFA and SOMA are thus conceived as permanent negotiating mandates for the purposes of Article 24 TEU, enabling the Presidency to rely on them as a basis for negotiations with third states without the need to seek a fresh mandate from the Council in specifi c cases. 123 As a result, only one Council decision approving the resulting text is necessary, which should considerably reduce the time required to conclude status arrangements under the ESDP. In this respect, the EU Model SOFA and SOMA build on the precedent set by the UN Model SOFA of 9 October 1990, which was prepared by the Secretariat of the UN as a means to expedite the conclusion of status arrangements for UN peace support operations. 124 The adoption of the two model agreements by the Council should also put an end, at least for the time being, to the controversy among the Member States concerning the extent of the privileges and immunities to be requested for ESDP operations and their personnel.
Since the EU Model SOFA and SOMA constitute permanent negotiating mandates to the Presidency, the Council considers that their disclosure would undermine the EU's position in future negotiations with third states. The Council has accordingly denied public access to the model agreements and related documents. 125 Nevertheless, the text of the agreements can be obtained from the Member States, which permits a detailed analysis of their provisions in the following section of this article. By the end of 2007, the EU has entered into two agreements based on the model agreements, the AMM SOMA and the SOFA concluded with Gabon in connection with EUFOR RD Congo .
126
These texts are for the most part identical with the EU Model SOFA and SOMA.
The Terms of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA
The decision to adopt separate model agreements for military operations and for civilian missions in the form of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA was most likely taken in recognition of the fact that distinct considerations apply to military and civilian crisis management missions. That military and civilian missions differ in a number of respects cannot be denied. 127 Nevertheless, the utility of having two separate model agreements may be questioned. The EU Model SOFA and SOMA are based on a broader range of sources than earlier status agreements concluded under the ESDP. In fact, it appears that those responsible for drawing up the two texts adopted a cut-and-paste approach to treaty drafting. The two model agreements rely heavily on the provisions of the VCDR and the UN Model SOFA, and include elements taken from the UN Privileges and Immunities Convention, the EU SOFA, the NATO SOFA, the ECMM/EUMM arrangements, the Concordia SOFA, and the Proxima SOMA. This approach has clearly affected their overall structure. Both model agreements open with a preamble, defi ne certain key terms, and specify the privileges, immunities, and facilities to be granted to EU crisis management missions and their members, and close by addressing certain technical matters. However, whereas related provisions of the UN Model SOFA are arranged into articles to make the document easier to navigate, the terms of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA do not appear to follow any logical order. It is therefore more convenient, for the purposes of the present analysis, to discuss their key provisions under substantive headings rather than in their numerical order.
A Preamble, Scope, and Defi nitions
The preambular paragraphs of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA begin by identifying the parties to the two agreements. Whereas Article 24 TEU does not clarify whether or not international agreements concluded by the Council under this provision are concluded on behalf of the EU, so far all status agreements concluded for the purposes of the ESDP name the ' European Union ' , rather than its Member States, as one of their contracting parties. The Council decisions authorizing the Presidency to sign these agreements have accordingly directed the Presidency to do so ' in order to bind the European Union ' . 129 The respective preambles to the EU Model SOFA and 128 E.g. the defi nition of ' facilities ' under Art. 1(3)(f) of the EU Model SOMA expressly includes buildings, whereas the corresponding defi nition under Art. 1(3)(h) of the EU Model SOFA does not. Similarly, Art. 4(7) of the EU Model SOMA grants ' EU Mission ' personnel ' free and unrestricted movement ' in the territory of the host state, whereas the corresponding provision, Art. 4(5) of the EU Model SOFA, grants ' EUFOR ' personnel ' freedom of movement and freedom to travel ' within the territory of the host state. SOMA continue this practice and identify the EU and the host state as the ' Parties ' to the agreements. The rest of the two preambles consist of two placeholders reserved for references to various instruments relevant to the operation or mission, such as UN Security Council resolutions, and one substantive paragraph.
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The substantive preambular paragraph of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA declares that ' this Agreement will not affect the Parties ' rights and obligations under international agreements and other instruments establishing international courts and tribunals, including the Statute of the International Criminal Court ' . The legal signifi cance of this clause, which is derived from the preamble to the EU SOFA, 131 is marginal. First, the chances that the EU Model SOFA and SOMA could affect the rights and obligations arising under the relevant international agreements and instruments are in most cases remote 132 or, as regards Security Council Resolutions, non-existent. 133 Secondly, the paragraph specifi cally refers to the rights and obligations of the ' Parties ' to the EU Model SOFA and SOMA, that is the EU and the relevant host state. However, the EU -conceived as an international organization that is legally distinct from its Member States -is not a party to any international agreements or other instruments establishing international courts and tribunals, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and as such is not subject to any obligations arising under these agreements and instruments. 134 Nor is the EU bound by the relevant Security Council Resolutions. 135 Thirdly, as regards the Member States ' obligations under the Rome Statute, no confl icts should arise between the EU Model SOFA and SOMA and the Rome Statute that cannot be addressed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Statute, in 130 Other preambular paras concerning the mission's duration and mandate, the EU's broader policy goals, or the objectives of the status agreement may be added, where appropriate. 131 The para. concerned fi rst appeared in the sixth revised version of the draft EU SOFA in Dec. particular Article 98. 136 Given its limited practical signifi cance, 137 it is safe to assume that this paragraph was inserted into the EU Model SOFA and SOMA ex abundanti cautela and in order to reaffi rm the EU's commitment to the Rome Statute.
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The EU Model SOFA and SOMA defi ne their scope of application by declaring that they shall apply to EU crisis management missions and their personnel, and shall do so only within the territory of the host state. 139 This underlines that the model agreements do not cover foreign personnel who are present in the territory of the host state for other purposes than participating in an EU crisis management operation, nor do they govern the legal status of members of EU operations outside the territory of the host state. The EU Model SOFA and SOMA also defi ne certain key terms used throughout the two agreements. 140 The central concept of the EU Model SOFA is the notion of ' European Union-led Forces (EUFOR) ' , which it defi nes as ' EU military headquarters and national contingents contributing to the operation, their equipment and their means of transport ' .
141 By contrast, the EU Model SOMA employs the concept of an ' EU Mission ' , which includes ' the components, forces, units, headquarters and personnel deployed in the territory of the Host State and assigned to ' a given EU crisis management mission. 142 Members of ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' are known as ' EUFOR ' personnel and ' EU Mission ' personnel. 143 Both classes of personnel are defi ned in broad terms. In particular, they include ' personnel on mission ' for a sending state or an EU institution in the framework of the operation or mission, which constitutes an innovation compared to earlier ESDP status agreements.
B Status and Facilities of EU Crisis Management Missions
The most important legal principle governing the position of EU crisis management missions and their personnel in the territory of the host state is spelled out in the fi rst 141 Art. 1(3)(a), EU Model SOFA. 142 Art. 1(3)(a), EU Model SOMA. The term ' EU Mission ' is used in the EU Model SOMA merely as a placeholder, and will be replaced by the offi cial code name of the mission in question. 143 Art. 1(3)(f), EU Model SOFA; Art. 1(3)(c), EU Model SOMA. substantive provisions of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA, which declare in identical terms that ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' and their respective personnel ' shall respect the laws and regulations of the Host State and shall refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the objectives ' of the operation or mission. 144 The duty to respect local law is a standard feature of modern SOFAs and SOMAs. 145 It gives effect to the territorial sovereignty of the host state by confi rming that, as a matter of general principle, foreign troops and personnel are subject to local laws and regulations. 146 With one exception, all status agreements concluded by the EU in the context of the ESDP have contained a provision to this effect. 147 The Concordia and Proxima status agreements even went one step further and imposed an obligation on the two missions concerned to respect local laws concerning the protection of the environment and cultural heritage.
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In practice, the implementation of the duty to respect local law has given rise to a number of diffi cult questions concerning its scope and nature. 149 The text of the NATO SOFA, for example, fails to make it suffi ciently clear whether the duty applies only to forces, their individual members, or both. 150 In the past, this ambiguity has led some NATO states to deny that their forces were bound by a general duty to respect local laws and regulations. 151 No diffi culties of this kind should arise under the EU Model SOFA and SOMA, given that these agreements clearly extend the duty to respect local law to both the EU crisis management mission and its individual members. However, unlike the UN Model SOFA, 152 the EU Model SOFA and SOMA do not direct the operation commander or the head of mission to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the duty to respect local law and to refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the objectives of the operation or mission is complied with. The EU Model SOFA and SOMA grant EU crisis management missions a series of privileges in the host state. None of these are particularly controversial, though some of them are unusual. The model agreements authorize ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' to display the fl ag of the EU on their facilities and elsewhere. 153 Unlike the UN Model SOFA, they also grant EU missions the right to display the national fl ags and insignia of their constituent national elements. EU crisis management missions benefi t from various privileges as regards the crossing of borders and movement within the territory of the host state. 154 For instance, the host state is bound to facilitate the entry and departure of EU missions and exempt their personnel from visa and immigration regulations. 155 The privileges conferred on ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' in this area are not identical, however. Whereas the EU Model SOMA provides that the vehicles and aircraft used by the ' EU Mission ' shall not be subject to local licensing or registration requirements, 156 the EU Model SOFA grants no comparable exemptions to ' EUFOR ' . EU crisis management missions may install and operate various communication devices and equipment in the territory of the host state without restrictions.
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They also enjoy the right to take charge of and make suitable arrangements for the repatriation of any deceased personnel and their personal property. 158 The host state undertakes to assist ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' in fi nding suitable facilities for the purposes of the operation or mission, and agrees to make facilities owned by it available free of charge. 159 Remarkably, the EU Model SOFA also requires host states to provide, free of charge, ' facilities owned by private legal entities ' if requested to do so by ' EUFOR ' . 160 In an equally remarkable move, the EU Model SOMA directs host states to provide the ' EU Mission ' with ' effective access ' to buildings, facilities, locations, and offi cial vehicles within their control as well as to documents, materials, and information within their control that are relevant to the mandate of the ' EU Mission ' . 161 The scope of this obligation is surprisingly broad.
The EU Model SOFA and SOMA grant EU crisis management missions similar immunities to those enjoyed by diplomatic missions under the VCDR. The facilities, archives, and documents and offi cial correspondence of ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' are inviolable. 162 The mission's ' facilities, their furnishings and other assets therein as well as its means of transport ' are immune from search, requisition, attachment, or execution. 163 Moreover, the mission itself, as well as its property and assets, enjoys immunity from every form of legal process. 164 ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' are exempt from all national, regional, and communal taxes and charges of a similar nature in respect of ' purchased and imported goods, services provided and facilities ' used by them for the purposes of the operation or mission. 165 Somewhat inconsistently, the model agreements add that ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' ' shall not be exempt from dues, taxes or charges that represent payment for services rendered ' . 166 It is notable that neither the EU Model SOFA nor the EU Model SOMA makes any provisions for the mandatory or discretionary waiver of the immunities enjoyed by ' EUFOR ' or the ' EU Mission ' . However, this should not prevent the competent authorities from waiving the immunities of an EU crisis management operation, though it is not clear who or what that competent authority may be. 167 The EU Model SOMA directs the host state to assume full responsibility for the security of ' EU Mission ' personnel and to take any necessary measures for the protection, safety, and security of the ' EU Mission ' and its personnel. 168 No provision to this effect was included in the EU Model SOFA, though the agreement entitles the force commander to establish a military police unit in order to maintain order in the facilities of ' EUFOR ' . 169 
C Privileges and Immunities of ' EUFOR ' and ' EU Mission ' Personnel
Members of EU crisis management operations benefi t from extensive privileges and immunities based on a combination of the privileges and immunities conferred on diplomatic agents under the VCDR and the relevant provisions of the UN Model SOFA. On the one hand, the EU Model SOFA and SOMA grant ' EUFOR ' and ' EU Mission ' personnel immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host state ' under all circumstances ' . 170 At the same time, they also entitle the competent authorities of the sending state to exercise in the territory of the host state ' all the criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary powers conferred on them by the law of the Sending State with regard to all [ " EUFOR " / " EU Mission " ] personnel subject to the relevant law of the Sending State ' . 171 As a result of these two provisions, the competent military and civilian authorities of a sending state may exercise their jurisdiction in the territory of the host state in accordance with their own laws and regulations in all criminal and disciplinary matters over any ' EUFOR ' and ' EU Mission ' personnel who are subject to the law of that sending state, to the complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the host state in these matters. On the other hand, the EU Model SOFA and SOMA exempt ' EUFOR ' and ' EU Mission ' personnel from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the host state ' in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in the exercise of their offi cial functions ' . 172 The model agreements also reproduce the procedure set out in the UN Model SOFA for determining whether or not the act in question was committed by ' EUFOR ' and ' EU Mission ' personnel in the performance of their offi cial functions, and add a useful clarifi cation whereby a certifi cation issued by the competent EU authorities to this effect shall be binding on the host state. 173 Members of EU crisis management operations enjoy a range of additional privileges and immunities as well. They are not liable to any form of arrest or detention, nor are they obliged to give evidence as witnesses. 174 No measures of execution can be taken against them, except in civil proceedings not related to their offi cial functions. 175 They are exempt from local social security provisions in respect of services rendered for the operation or mission. 176 They are also exempt from any form of taxation in the host state on the salary and emoluments they receive from ' EUFOR ' or the ' EU Mission ' and their sending state as well as on any income they receive from outside the host state. 177 Their papers, correspondence, and property enjoy inviolability, and their personal baggage is exempt from inspection. 178 Articles for their personal use are exempt from all customs duties, taxes, and related charges. 179 In addition, the EU Model SOMA grants ' EU Mission ' personnel the right to ' purchase free of duty or quantitative restrictions items required for their personal use ' and exempts such personnel from VAT and taxes for goods and services purchased on the domestic market. 180 The EU Model SOFA contains no comparable provision.
D Claims
The conduct of peace support operations often causes injury and damage to private parties in the host state, such as injury and damage resulting from the use of armed force against individuals 181 or from the occupation and destruction of private property. 182 The prompt and fair settlement of claims relating to the acts or omissions of peace support operations can play a signifi cant role in maintaining amicable relations between them and the local population. However, the fact that status agreements normally exempt peace support operations and their members from local civil jurisdiction in matters arising out of the performance of their offi cial duties means that private parties are unable to bring claims relating to such cases directly before the judicial authorities of the host state. The entity or entities that are responsible under international law for the activities of an operation -which, depending on the act or omission in question, include the international organization controlling the operation, the sending states, or both -therefore may decide to discharge their international obligation to make full reparation for such injury and damage by creating alternative procedures to compensate private claimants. 183 Status agreements concluded by the UN both before and after the adoption of the UN Model SOFA provide for the establishment of a standing claims commission in order to settle disputes of a private law character over which the local courts have no jurisdiction because of the immunity attaching to a UN peace support operation and its members. 184 However, no UN standing claims commission has ever been established in practice. Instead, third-party claims not resulting from operational necessity are settled by the operation internally through a local claims review board composed of UN offi cials. 185 More recent status agreements concluded by the UN now acknowledge this practice, and provide that standing claims commissions shall settle only those claims which cannot be settled in accordance with the internal procedures of the UN. 186 Multinational peace support operations not falling under UN command and control, such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR), Operation Alba, and KFOR, employ somewhat different procedures. Claims brought by private parties relating to acts or omissions attributable to members of a national contingent are usually settled by the contingent itself. Only claims that cannot be settled in this way because of a dispute between the claimant and the national contingent concerned as well as claims relating to the activities of the operation's international elements are settled by a standing claims commission and, in the fi nal instance, by an arbitration tribunal or commission. 187 In sharp contrast to international practice at the time, the status arrangements adopted for the ECMM and the EU Administration of Mostar compelled the host states concerned to indemnify the sending parties in respect of any claims connected with the activities of these missions and their personnel, and did not establish alternative mechanisms to compensate private individuals who suffered injury or damage as a result of their activities.
188 Surprisingly, the EUMM status agreements and the EUPM SOMA did not deal with the settlement of claims at all. This omission was remedied in subsequent ESDP status agreements. The Concordia SOFA called for the establishment of a Joint Claims Commission composed of representatives of the EU force and the competent authorities of the host state to deal with claims for death, injury, damage, or loss. 189 The detailed procedures for addressing and settling claims were to be specifi ed in separate arrangements concluded between the force commander and the competent local authorities. 190 By contrast, the Proxima SOMA and subsequent agreements based on it simply provided that claims shall be submitted to the head of mission to be settled in accordance with the procedures defi ned in separate arrangements to be concluded between the head of mission and the authorities of the host state. 191 The lack of reference to a joint claims commission in these agreements suggests that claims were to be settled internally by the EU mission without the involvement of the representatives of the host state, as in the case of UN local claims review boards.
The EU Model SOFA and SOMA put into place more elaborate claims settlement procedures, consisting of three main stages, than the earlier ESDP status agreements did. The model agreements begin by declaring that ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' and their personnel shall not be liable for any damage to or loss of civilian or government property related to operational necessities or caused in connection with civil disturbances or the protection of ' EUFOR ' or the ' EU Mission ' . 192 Signifi cantly, this disclaimer is expressly limited to claims involving damage to or loss of property, and is therefore narrower in scope than the disclaimer clauses found in earlier ESDP status agreements and some recent UN instruments. 193 In the fi rst instance, claims for damage to or loss of civilian or government property that are not covered by the disclaimer clause as well as claims for death of or injury to persons shall be forwarded to ' EUFOR ' or the ' EU Mission ' by the competent authorities of the host state with a view to reaching an amicable settlement. 194 Where no amicable settlement can be reached using the internal settlement procedures of the mission or operation, the claim shall be submitted to a claims commission composed on an equal basis of representatives of ' EUFOR ' or the ' EU Mission ' and representatives of the host state. The claims commission operates by consensus. 195 Finally, where no settlement can be reached within the claims commission, disputes involving claims of up to and including € 40,000 are to be settled by diplomatic means between the host state and EU representatives, while disputes concerning claims above € 40,000 are to be submitted for a binding decision to an arbitration tribunal composed of three arbitrators appointed by the host state and ' EUFOR ' or the ' EU Mission ' . 196 The terms of reference of the claims commission and the arbitration tribunal, as well as the conditions under which claims may be lodged, are to be determined in administrative arrangements concluded between the host state and ' EUFOR ' or the ' EU Mission ' . 197 The primary objective of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA is to bring about the amicable settlement of claims through the internal mechanisms of the ESDP operation. Should this fail, the model agreements provide for the involvement of the representatives of the host state in the form of a mixed claims commission and, in the fi nal instance, an arbitration tribunal. Two diffi culties arise with this procedure. First, some claims may arise only after the termination of the EU crisis management mission, EU representatives to the claims commission and the arbitration tribunal to a permanent organ based in Brussels, such as the Political and Security Committee. Secondly, the fact that it is up to the force commander or head of mission of each EU crisis management operation to defi ne, through negotiations with the host states concerned, the terms of reference and detailed operating procedures of the claims commission and the arbitration tribunal leads to a duplication of efforts and hampers the emergence of common standards and a consistent claims settlement practice under the ESDP. 199 The use of generic terms of reference and procedures, the creation of a central database held by the General Secretariat of the Council containing copies of the relevant administrative arrangements as well as the individual claims dossiers, and the identifi cation of ' lessons learned ' in settling third party claims during successive EU crisis management operations could go a long way in remedying this defect.
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E Final provisions
The fi nal provisions of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA address certain technical matters. For instance, they emphasize that the government of the host state bears responsibility for implementing and ensuring compliance with the privileges, immunities, and rights granted to ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' and their respective personnel. 201 They also expressly recognize that separate arrangements may be concluded between the force commander or the head of mission and the authorities of the host state to deal with operational, administrative, and technical matters. 202 In contrast to the UN Model SOFA and earlier ESDP status agreements, the EU Model SOFA and SOMA provide that they shall enter into force upon signature, rather than following their ratifi cation. 203 They also provide that some of their provisions shall be deemed to have applied from the date of the operation's deployment if that date precedes their entry into force. 204 This retrospective application of the model agreements is not workable in all cases, however. Whereas the right of ' EUFOR ' and the ' EU Mission ' to use any public roads without the payment of fees or charges can be given retrospective effect by reimbursing any fees already paid, it is diffi cult to see, for example, how the inviolability of their offi cial correspondence can be fully guaranteed in this way.
Since 1998, the Security Council has on several occasions decided that the UN Model SOFA shall apply provisionally to UN operations pending the conclusion of a permanent status agreement between the Organization and host states. 205 There is no reason why the EU should not use the EU Model SOFA and SOMA in the same way. The provisional application of the two model agreements would prove particularly useful in cases where an operation is launched at short notice or where the signature of fi nal status arrangements has been delayed. 206 Giving effect to the terms of the model agreements in such cases on a provisional basis would certainly lead to greater legal clarity than their retrospective application or falling back on the relevant principles of customary international law. However, whereas the Security Council may use its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to compel a host state to apply the UN Model SOFA, or indeed any other status agreement, in the context of a peace support operation, the provisional application of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA would depend on the consent of the host state.
Conclusions
The EU's practice in negotiating status agreements with third parties has evolved along two main lines over the past 15 years. First, the status agreements concluded by the EU have become increasingly more sophisticated. The most recent agreements regulate a broader range of matters and do so in greater detail than most of their predecessors, including the fi rst ESDP status agreement, the EUPM SOMA. Secondly, the process of concluding status agreements under the ESDP has been simplifi ed. The experiences gained during the fi rst few ESDP missions have clearly demonstrated that the procedures governing the conclusion of international agreements under Article 24 TEU were unwieldy and therefore unsuited to keeping up with the fast pace of international crisis management operations. 207 In response, the Council adopted the EU Model SOFA and SOMA to eliminate the need to issue a fresh negotiating mandate to the Presidency in the course of future EU crisis management operations.
The adoption of the two model agreements should be welcomed as a sign of the ESDP's maturity. 208 In addition to streamlining the decision-making process under Article 24 TEU, the model agreements should help to increase the consistency of the EU's dealings with host states and local populations, in particular as regards the settlement of claims brought by private parties against ESDP missions. The drafters of the EU Model SOFA and SOMA have clearly attempted to build upon the experiences of the EU and other international actors by introducing several important clarifi cations and innovations to the model agreements. For example, the EU Model SOFA expressly declares that the right granted to ' EUFOR ' and its personnel to move and travel freely within the territory of the host state includes its territorial sea and air space. 209 Similarly, unlike the UN Model SOFA, the EU model agreements entitle EU crisis management missions to construct, alter, or otherwise modify facilities in the host state.
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At the same time, the EU Model SOFA and SOMA suffer from certain shortcomings. The fact that the two model agreements differ in places where they should not somewhat undermines their contribution to consistency in the ESDP. For example, ' EUFOR ' personnel are exempt from customs control when entering, leaving, or staying within the territory of the host state, but ' EU Mission ' personnel are not. 211 Similarly, whereas the EU Model SOMA recognizes the autonomy of the ' EU Mission ' and calls on the host state to respect its international character, 212 the EU Model SOFA is silent on this matter. Surely, ' EU Mission ' personnel should be exempt from local customs control under the same conditions as ' EUFOR ' personnel, while the international nature of military operations merits equal recognition to the international nature of civilian missions. Both model agreements fail to address certain questions, such as the right to recruit local personnel. 213 Moreover, even though their respective preambles clarify that the model agreements apply solely to personnel taking part in EU crisis management missions, this does not exclude the possibility that other bilateral or multilateral status agreements in force between one or more sending states and the host state may also apply to such personnel. A provision determining which of the applicable status agreements should take precedence would have been helpful. 214 The extent of the privileges and immunities conferred on EU crisis management missions and their personnel presents more serious diffi culties. The EU Model SOFA and SOMA do not represent a clear break with the EU's past practice of requesting privileges and immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by diplomatic missions and agents under the VCDR. Although the model agreements no longer grant full diplomatic status to EU missions and their members in formal terms, they now simply reproduce, subject to signifi cant modifi cations and additions, the relevant privileges and 209 Art. 4(5), EU Model SOFA. See also Art. 4(7), EU Model SOFA. 210 immunities found in the VCDR. Combined with the conferment of a range of additional privileges and immunities, this means that the legal status granted to EU missions and their members in the territory of the host state does not correspond to current international practice in several respects. 215 Perhaps the most glaring difference between the model agreements and recent international practice in this area results from the complete exemption of civilian personnel from local jurisdiction in criminal matters and the corresponding entitlement of the sending state to exercise all criminal jurisdiction over such personnel in accordance with its own laws. 216 Normally, only military personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state in criminal matters under all circumstances. 217 The fact that the EU Model SOFA and SOMA confer more extensive privileges and immunities on EU crisis management missions and their members than those granted to international and multinational peace support operations working under similar conditions is bound to be controversial, in particular now that the accountability of peacekeeping operations is receiving ever more attention in academic circles as well as in international fora. 218 It is unlikely that those EU Member States which have opposed the conferment of full diplomatic status on ESDP missions, and their personnel will be completely satisfi ed with the EU Model SOFA and SOMA. Similarly, certain third states hosting EU missions may well consider that the model agreements are biased too much in favour of the EU. 219 In this respect, it is regrettable that the EU Model SOFA and SOMA do not offer the Presidency alternative negotiating strategies depending on the legal, political, and security situation in the host state, as did the model agreement for EU police missions prepared by the Council General Secretariat. Indeed, the problem with the EU's approach lies in the fact that it seeks to confer extensive privileges and immunities on ESDP operations as a general rule, rather than reserve this option for those more volatile operational circumstances where a high level of legal protection is perfectly justifi ed. 220 Whatever their strengths and weaknesses, the conclusion of status agreements in the context of the ESDP has already had a profound impact on the visibility of the EU on the international legal scene. Several commentators have relied on these and related agreements to suggest that they confi rm beyond doubt that the EU is capable of operating as an independent subject of international law. 221 The interpretation of Article 24 TEU and the question whether or not the EU possesses international legal personality have long been the subject of debate. 222 Given the somewhat abstract nature of the arguments involved, it is certainly tempting to point to the Council's practice of concluding international agreements in the name of the ' European Union ' as conclusive proof that the EU enjoys implied or de facto legal personality under international law. However, a careful analysis of the provisions of the relevant status agreements should temper some of this enthusiasm. It may well be that ' fairly strange intellectual operations ' are now required to demonstrate that international agreements concluded pursuant to Article 24 TEU create legal relations between the third parties concerned and each of the Member States of the EU, rather than between those third parties and the EU as such. 223 However, the fact remains that the international obligation to make reparation for any injury and damage caused by EU crisis management missions is discharged, in accordance with the procedures laid down in the relevant status agreements, by the institutions of the EU and the sending states acting individually or jointly: the EU as such plays no role whatsoever in this respect. 224 Even though this excludes neither the possibility that the EU enjoys international legal personality nor the possibility that it bears (concurrent) responsibility for the acts or omissions of EU crisis management operations under international law, it nevertheless underlines that in practice the Union is, for the time being, an international actor more in name than in substance.
